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Abstract
Among the most serious challenges to scientific realism are argu-
ments for the underdetermination of theory by evidence. This paper
defends a version of scientific realism against what is perhaps the
most influential recent argument of this sort, viz. Kyle Stanford’s
New Induction over the History of Science. An essential part of the
defense consists in a probabilistic analysis of the slogan “absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence”. On this basis it is argued that
the likelihood of a theory being underdetermined depends crucially
on social and historical factors, such as the structure of scientific
communities and the time that has passed since the theory first be-
came accepted. This is then shown to serve as the epistemological
foundation for a version of scientific realism which avoids Stanford’s
New Induction in a principled and non-question-begging way.
1 Introduction
“Scientific realism” is a label applied to a notoriously large number of views,
many of which are in no conflict with one another. The kind of scientific
realism that will interest us in this paper is epistemic in that it concerns
what we can justifiably believe concerning the posits of scientific theories.
More precisely, I shall take epistemic realism to be the view that we are
epistemically justified in believing that at least some of the claims made
by empirically successful scientific theories – including those that concern
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unobservable entities – are at least approximately true.1
Which scientific claims? Well, first of all, realists tend to emphasize em-
pirical success, urging that we should only claim to be justified in believing
that empirically successful theories are true. In addition, most realists these
days advocate “selective” realisms, in that they urge that only some proper
subset of claims made by empirically successful theories are epistemically
justified. For example, the entity realism of Cartwright (1983) and Hack-
ing (1983) focuses on the subset of claims about the causally efficacious
entities posited by scientific theories. The structural realism of Worrall
(1989, 1994) focuses on claims that concern the structure of the world in
so far as it can be described by purely mathematical models. Finally, the
explanationist realism of Kitcher (1993, 2001) and Psillos (1999) focuses on
the claims that are essential for explaining the theory’s empirical success.
This paper can be seen as taking the first step towards a different kind of
selective realism, one that focuses on claims that enjoy a certain kind of
privileged status within scientific communities.
My main objective is to defend this version of epistemic realism against
an influential argument that purports to show that scientific theories are
underdetermined by the evidence that is meant to support them. As many
authors have pointed out – including notably Laudan (1990), Gillies (1993),
Kitcher (1993), and Stanford (2013) – there is not a single problem of un-
derdetermination but a cluster of related problems that should not be con-
flated. One historically significant kind of underdetermination thesis claims
that for any scientific theory that posits unobservables, there is an incom-
patible theory – a “rival” – that is equally well supported given any evidence
E. In support of this thesis, it has been argued that for any theory T , we
can construct a rival T* that makes all the same empirical predictions as
T , and thus no empirical evidence E could possibly distinguish between T
and T* (Kukla, 1993). However, as Stanford (2001, 2006) points out, this
arguably proves too much, in that it would undermine more than just sci-
entific realism. After all, we can construct algorithms of a similar kind for
any proposition that purports to be inductively established – be it about
unobservable entities posited by scientific theories or the ordinary observ-
1Since nothing in this paper turns on the distinction between true and approximately
true theories, I shall henceforth use “true” to stand for “true or approximately true”.
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able objects that we can see and touch. So this argument would seem to
force us towards a more radical kind of anti-realism not just about unob-
servable entities, but also about many observable entities – and perhaps
even to skepticism about the external world itself.2
What would pose a special problem for scientific realism, however, is
if it could be argued that successful theories that posit unobservable en-
tities regularly have equally well supported serious rival theories – non-
skeptical alternative theories that would be taken seriously by the working
scientist. If it could be show that there are rival theories of this sort for
most currently accepted scientific theories about unobservables, then epis-
temic realists could not dismiss underdetermination as “everyone’s prob-
lem.” Accordingly, anti-realists have recently argued that our justification
for theories about unobservables is threatened not just by the existence
of skeptical alternatives produced by some general algorithm, but rather
by serious alternative theories that propose genuinely distinct accounts of
the unobservable aspects of reality and that would be taken seriously as
such by working scientists. Following Stanford (2001, 2006), let us call this
Recurrent, Transient Underdetermination:
RTU: For most successful scientific theories that posit unobservable
entities, there exist serious rivals to those theories that are equally well
supported given the currently available evidence.3
From now on, I shall say that a theory T is underdetermined just in case our
current evidence supports some serious rival T* equally well as it supports
T ; and I shall refer to such a rival T* as an underdetermination rival to
T . Stated in these terms, RTU is the thesis that most successful theories
that posit unobservable are underdetermined, i.e. have underdetermination
rivals. This is the underdetermination thesis that I shall be concerned with
2This is not to say that algorithms of this sort would not be a problem for scientific
realism as well. The point is rather that the problem would extend also to a host
of other philosophical positions, including anti-realist positions such as Stanford’s own
instrumentalism (which does not deny the possibility of inductive knowledge in general
and even allows for the existence of some scientific knowledge concerning unobservable
entities and processes (see e.g. Stanford, 2006, 31-33)).
3Stanford focuses on scientific claims about “fundamental constituents of the natural
world” (Stanford, 2006, 32) rather than those about unobservable objects. In what
follows, this difference will not be important.
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in the rest of this paper.4
How might one argue in favor of RTU? Well, one strategy would be to
go through all successful theories that posit unobservable entities and show
by example that most of them have underdetermination rivals. However,
most of the time we cannot do that, because (as realists like to point
out) it is often hard enough to find a single theory that fits the evidence
at hand, let alone more than that. (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) So, on
this strategy, the anti-realist would only undermine the justification for
believing a very select group of theories, namely those for which we can find
such rivals. While some such rivals have arguably been identified, e.g. by
(Glymour, 1977), these examples do not establish the sweeping conclusion
that most successful scientific theories have such rivals. Moreover, it’s clear
that not even the most devout realists would recommend that we believe
theories that we know to have underdetermination rivals. (Psillos, 1999)
So, if underdetermination is to be a problem for even remotely sophisticated
epistemic realisms, then there must be some way to argue that even theories
for which we haven’t (yet) produced underdetermination rivals are likely
to be underdetermined.
That is indeed what anti-realists have tried to do in recent years. Influ-
enced by the classic Pessimistic Meta-Induction (Poincaré, 1952; Putnam,
1978; Laudan, 1981), anti-realists have argued that investigation into the
history of science suggests that at least in many cases, scientists have sim-
ply failed to conceive of underdetermination rivals to successful scientific
4In stating RTU I have deliberately been somewhat vague on what counts as a serious
rival since the positions and arguments that follow do not turn on precisely how this
notion is defined. Two points are worth emphasizing however: (i) For the purposes
of this paper, a rival theory is simply a theory that is incompatible with the theory
it rivals. Some would argue that a theory doesn’t count as a rival theory unless it
at least addresses the question answered by the theory it rivals, so that (for example)
the negation of a theory doesn’t normally count as a rival to the theory, despite being
incompatible with it. (Leplin and Laudan, 1993) While I agree (see [reference omitted]),
I will operate with the more inclusive definition of “rival theory” in order to ensure that
Stanford’s argument is not being construed uncharitably. (ii) I am following Stanford
(2001, 2006) in characterizing a serious rival to a given theory as a theory that would
be viewed by working scientists as a genuine non-skeptical alternative to the theory.
This is admittedly somewhat vague since it is not entirely clear what it is for scientists
to view a theory as a genuine non-skeptical alternative. Thus one could complain that
RTU should be dismissed on the grounds that the alleged problem has not been clearly
posed. However, since I do not want to decide the matter on a technicality of this sort,
I will operate with Stanford’s admittedly somewhat vague notion in what follows.
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theories, even when such rivals existed. According to proponents of this
argument, this gives us (inductive, empirical) evidence for the conclusion
that currently accepted theories, especially the ones that concern unobserv-
able entities, are also likely to have rivals of this sort. In short, we would
have reasons to think that most presently accepted scientific theories are
underdetermined by the currently available evidence. Although both Hesse
(1976) and Sklar (1981) can be read as proposing arguments of this sort,
the most prominent recent proponent of the argument is Stanford (2001,
2006, 2009), who calls it the New Induction over the History of Science.5
In what follows, I develop a line of response to this argument, undermin-
ing the support for RTU. However, let me be upfront about the fact that I
think it’s clear that there is some truth to RTU, for sometimes we really do
have good reasons to suppose that there are underdetermination rivals to
our theories – even when no such rivals have been identified. Accordingly,
it seems to me that the epistemic realist should look for a way of distin-
guishing between those theories (and indeed those parts of theories) that
are more and less likely to be underdetermined. Using such a distinction,
we can argue that the New Induction does not go through for the theories
that fall on the less-likely-to-be-underdetermined side of the distinction. So
my response to this argument is not to argue it is wholly without merit,
but rather to find a suitably restricted set of scientific theories for which
it does not apply. I should also emphasize that I will not argue against
RTU directly, but rather argue that the New Induction does not succeed
in establishing it (for a suitably restricted set of theories).
Many previous authors have suggested structurally similar responses to
Stanford’s New Induction (or its ancestor, the Pessimistic Meta-Induction),
in that they argue that now-discarded theories are relevantly different from
currently accepted theories so as not to warrant an induction from the
former to the latter. Note that this is not so much a strategy for responding
to these arguments as it is the strategy, since any epistemic realist will
5See also Roush (2005), Magnus (2010), and Wray (2011). Of course, the name
and general structure of the argument stems from Laudan’s (1981) hugely influential
discussion of the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this
paper it is important not to confuse the two arguments since the argument that follows is
concerned specifically with the existence of underdetermination rivals to current scientific
theories – an issue on which the Pessimistic Meta-Induction is silent.
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have to provide some way of blocking the anti-realist induction from past
to present theories. The hard and interesting part of any realist response
is to provide a principled and non-question-begging way of drawing the
distinction between “good” and “bad” theories such that some significant
subset of currently accepted theories fall in the former category whereas
now-discarded theories fall in the latter. This paper aims to do precisely
that by showing how a relevant distinction can be drawn based on a widely
accepted probabilistic approach to epistemology and some uncontroversial
facts about how science has evolved over the years. Thus the paper (if
successful) provides a sound epistemological foundation for a defensible
kind of scientific realism and a new response to the New Induction that is
neither ad hoc nor question-begging.
Before we go any further, let me foreshadow the line of argumentation
in what follows. The key point for which I will be arguing is that there
are certain readily identifiable indicators of when a theory is likely to have
unconsidered underdetermination rivals, which may be then used to distin-
guish between theories that are more and less likely to be underdetermined.
In section 3, I discuss these indicators, which concern various sociological
and historical factors, such as the length of time a theory has been accepted
and the nature of the scientific community that operates with the theory.
Using these indicators, I argue (in section 4) that the inductive base of the
New Induction is dissimilar to the inductive target in precisely the respect
about which the argument makes its conclusion. In order to flesh out this
response with as much precision and robustness as possible, however, I will
first consider an issue (in section 2) that may appear to be quite unrelated
to underdetermination, namely the truth (or otherwise) behind the slogan
“absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. As we shall see, a proba-
bilistic analysis of the conditions under which the slogan comes out as true
will help in determining what sorts of factors are relevant to how likely a
theory is to be underdetermined (in the relevant sense).
2 Evidence and Absence
A popular slogan among scientists and statisticians has it that “absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence”. The slogan admits of many interpreta-
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tions. On one interpretation, the slogan holds that the fact that one hasn’t
come across something cannot even constitute part of one’s evidence for
the claim that no such thing exists. Thus interpreted, the slogan appears
false: Consider your belief that there are no (genuine) pink elephants. How
is this belief justified? It looks like an important piece of information justi-
fying this belief may very well be that you have never seen a (genuine) pink
elephant. After all, if you had seen a pink elephant, then you’d presumably
not be justified in believing that there aren’t any.
As Sober (2009) points out, this intuitive judgment is borne out in a
Bayesian account of evidential support. On this account, E confirms H
just in case p(H|E) > p(H). The right-hand side of this biconditional is
equivalent to p(E|H) > p(E|¬H), so on the Bayesian account anything one
learns that is more likely to be the case given the truth of some hypothesis
than given its negation confirms that hypothesis. Since one can surely be
more likely not to have seen a pink elephant if there are no such things
than if there are, it follows that on the Bayesian account the fact that one
hasn’t seen a pink elephant can confirm that there are none. Thus it looks
like “absence of evidence” can be “evidence of absence” on the Bayesian
account of confirmation.6
On a more charitable interpretation of “absence of evidence is not evi-
dence of absence”, the slogan holds that not having evidence that something
exists is not sufficient for being rationally confident that it doesn’t exist.
Here the statement “E is evidence of H” is interpreted not as claiming that
E makes H more likely than it would otherwise be, but as claiming that E
makes H likely to be true – sufficiently likely, perhaps, for one to believe,
accept, or be reasonably confident that H is true.7 This point is illustrated
by the pink elephant case, since the mere fact that one hasn’t come across
6Sober (2009) also points out that there is something to the slogan that “absence
of evidence is not evidence of absence” in that absence of evidence is usually not very
strong evidence for absence, given a “likelihoodist” measure of strength of confirmation.
As Strevens (2009) points out, however, this is hardly a completely satisfactory inter-
pretation of the original slogan, for it contradicts the slogan’s apparent meaning. I offer
a different way of interpreting the slogan below – one that does not contradict the ap-
parent meaning of the slogan.
7Salmon (1975) famously distinguished between these two interpretations, referring
to the first as the “relevance concept of confirmation” and the second as the “absolute
concept of confirmation”.
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pink elephants is presumably not by itself sufficient to justify a reasonably
high degree of confidence that there are no pink elephants. More generally,
there are obviously many kinds of things that you shouldn’t be confident
don’t exist even though you have never come across such things. So it looks
like there is something to the idea that absence of evidence is not evidence
of absence, if interpreted as the claim that the fact that one hasn’t come
across something is not sufficient for justifying a reasonably high degree of
confidence that it doesn’t exist.
Now, if the second version of the slogan is correct, but not the first,
then absence of evidence may be part of of one’s justification for being
reasonably confident that things of that kind (probably) don’t exist, but
it cannot be the only part. This raises the following question: Provided
that one knows that one has not come across something, when should one
be reasonably confident that things of this kind don’t exist? What other
factors need to be present in order for “absence of evidence” to form part of
one’s justification for a reasonably high degree of confidence that the thing
in question really is absent? A natural strategy for answering this question
in a precise way, which follows Sober’s cue, is to look to epistemological
applications of probability theory. In the discussion that follows on realism
and underdetermination, we will be giving these probabilities a frequency
interpretation. For now, however, we can for convenience follow Sober –
and Bayesians more generally – in taking them to refer to rational degrees
of confidence.
Let FX be the proposition that instances of some particular kind X have
been found or discovered, and let AX be the hypothesis that no things of
kind X exist. Given this, we can represent the rational degree of confidence
that there are no Xs given the fact that no Xs have been found (and
also given some background evidence B) as the conditional probability
p(AX |¬FX&B). The significance of this is illustrated by Bayes’s Theorem:
p(AX |¬FX&B) =
p(¬FX |AX&B)p(AX |B)
p(¬FX |AX&B)p(AX |B) + p(¬FX |¬AX&B)p(¬AX |B)
(1)
Before we go further, let us simplify (1) in two ways. First, since the
probabilities of a proposition and its negation always sum to one, we
can replace p(¬AX |B) with (1 − p(AX |B)), and p(¬FX |¬AX&B) with
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(1− p(FX |¬AX&B)). Second, consider p(¬FX |AX&B): This is the proba-
bility that one would not have found something of a particular kind given
that there are no such things (and given background evidence B). Since
“finding” is factive in the sense that one cannot find something of a kind
that doesn’t exist, AX entails ¬FX . Hence the probability calculus dic-
tates that p(¬FX |AX&B) = 1.8 Using some simple algebra, we can thus
reformulate (1) as follows:
p(AX |¬FX&B) = 1
1 + (1− p(FX |¬AX&B))( 1p(AX |B) − 1)
(2)
From (2) we see that the probability of AX if ¬FX is part of your evidence
(and B is your background knowledge) depends on two (and only two)
factors:
(a) p(AX |B): the probability of AX given only B,
(b) p(FX |¬AX&B): the probability of FX given B and that AX is false.
More precisely, the probability of AX given ¬FX (and B) is higher to
the extent that (a) and (b) are higher. This will help us see when not
having found something makes it likely that something doesn’t exist, so
let’s discuss these two factors in turn.
Regarding (a): This is the probability that there are no things of a cer-
tain kind independently of whether such things have been found. It should
come as no surprise that the probability of there not being anything of a
certain kind is positively dependent on this probability. Returning to our
previous example, the probability of there not being any pink elephants
given the fact that you’ve never come across any such things is clearly pro-
portional to the probability of there not being any pink elephants regardless
8This simplification obviously depends on FX being the proposition that one has in
fact found an X (e.g. as opposed to the proposition that one merely believes oneself to
have found an X). It is of course possible for an agent to be mistaken about whether
she has found something of a given kind, e.g. as Rene Blondlot mistakenly believed in
1903 that he had discovered a new form of radiation, “N-rays”. However, even an agent
who believes herself to have found something that does not in fact exist should assign
probability 1 to p(¬FX |AX&B), since by her lights the conditional “If Xs did not exist,
I would not have found any Xs” is still necessarily true. Such an agent, if rational, would
not object to the conditional itself, but instead deny the consequent of the conditional
and thus also its antecendent.
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of whether you have found any. Had you thought, for example, that there
are a lot of pink mammals, or that elephants come in all sorts of colors,
then you should be less confident that there are no pink elephants, quite
independently of the fact that you haven’t come across pink elephants.
Regarding (b): This is the probability that we would have found some-
thing of a particular kind given that such things exist. Again, it should
come as no surprise that this is relevant to the probability of there being
things of a given kind, for when we argue that something doesn’t exist on
the basis of us not having found any such thing, then we seem to be assum-
ing that it’s at least somewhat likely that we would have found such a thing
if it existed. In our pink elephant case, it surely matters to the probability
of pink elephants existing how probable one finds it that one would have
come across pink elephants if they existed. This might depend on one’s
background beliefs, for example one whether one believes that there has
been a substantial (but unsuccessful) search for pink elephants, diligently
conducted by the Official Scout of the Pink Elephant Society.
Note that (2) illustrates that the probability that something doesn’t ex-
ist might be high even when (a) is very low, provided that (b) is high enough
to compensate: If p(AX |B) is very low, then ( 1p(AX |B)−1) will be very high,
but if p(FX |¬AX&B) is high enough, then (1−p(FX |¬AX&B))( 1P (AX |B)−1)
can still be quite low, and so p(AX |¬FX&B) would still be fairly close to 1.
The converse is true as well, of course: The probability that that something
doesn’t exist might be high even when (b) is very low, provided that (a)
is high enough to compensate. Generally, on a probabilistic analysis, (a)
and (b) are both relevant to how confident one should be that something
doesn’t exist, but a strong presence of one factor can compensate for a lack
of the other. This is important because it reminds us of just how mislead-
ing it can be to focus on only one of the two factors, and thus mistakenly
assume that any argument is weak if that factor is not strongly present.
We need to look at the two factors in concert.
Now, how is all of this relevant to epistemic realism and RTU? To a first
approximation – to be spelled out in the following section – the argument
goes as follows: Consider a scientific theory T for which we haven’t come
across any underdetermination rival. Since a theory is underdetermined
(in the relevant sense) just in case it has such an underdetermination rival,
the conditions under which a theory is likely not to have any underdeter-
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mination rival are precisely the conditions under which we should conclude
the theory is unlikely to be underdetermined. Hence we can distinguish
– in a principled and epistemically motivated way – between the theories
that are more and less likely to be underdetermined based on the extent to
which the probabilities here labelled (a) and (b) are present with regard to
underdetermination rivals for such theories. This basic idea will constitute
an important part of the my response to Stanford’s New Induction.
3 Determining Underdetermination
In the previous section, I argued that as a general matter, the fact that we
haven’t found something of a given kind makes it likely that there are no
such things depends on the combined extent to which (a) it is likely that
something exists regardless of whether it has been found, and (b) it is likely
that we would have found such things if they existed. We now apply this
probabilistic lesson to the question of how likely it is that a given scientific
theory has underdetermination rivals, i.e. (undiscovered) rival theories that
are equally well supported given one’s current evidence. Our aim will be to
distinguish between theories that are more and less likely to be have such
underdetermination rivals, for this (as I’ll argue in the next section) will
equip us with the tools to undermine the New Induction in a principled
and non-question-begging manner.
In the previous section we were interested in a Bayesian analysis of the
slogan “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”. Our interest now
is not with absences of evidence, but with absences of underdetermination
rivals. In particular, we are trying to locate a set of theories for which the
fact that no underdetermination rivals have been found indicates that there
are no such underdetermination rivals to be found – that the currently ac-
cepted theory is not just better supported by serious rivals theories we are
aware of but also better supported than any rivals that we could come to be
aware of. Another important difference between the preceding discussion
and what follows is that we will now switch from a Bayesian interpretation
of the probabilities to a frequency interpretation. So the probabilities to
be discussed in what follows are the relative frequencies in the members of
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various sets of scientific theories.9 For example, the probability of some-
thing being in a set A given that it is in another set B, p(A|B),10 signifies
the frequency with which members of B are also in A.
Now, let AU be the set of hypotheses for which there are no underde-
termination rivals, and let FU be the set of hypotheses for which underde-
termination rivals have been found. What we are interested in is finding
a set X such that most theories in X for which underdetermination rivals
have not been found do indeed not have any such rivals. Given a frequency
interpretation of the following probabilities, we are in other words seeking
an X such that p(AU |FU ,X ) is high (where FU is the set of theories for
which underdetermination rivals have not been found). In an exactly anal-
ogous way as in section 2 we have that, since no underdetermination rivals
could possibly be found to theories for which there are no such underde-
termination rivals at all, p(FU |AX ,X ) = 1.11 As before, then, we calculate
p(AU |FU ,X ) as follows:
p(AU |FU ,X ) = 1
1 + (1− p(FU |AU ,X ))( 1p(AU |X ) − 1)
(3)
Again this reveals that the probability in question depends on two and only
two factors, which I will henceforth refer to as follows:
plausibility: p(AU |X ); the frequency of theories for which there are
no underdetermination rivals among the theories in X as a whole.
9This frequency interpretation is appropriate in the context of of evaluating argu-
ments for RTU, which holds that most empirically successful theories are underdeter-
mined – i.e., that the frequency of underdetermined theories is high among empirically
successful theories.
10Here I am abusing notation by writing p(A|B) instead of p(x ∈ A|x ∈ B).
11Of course, this is not to say that one could not mistakenly believe oneself we have
found an underdetermination rival to a given theory even when no such rivals exist.
While the possibility of mistakenly believing oneself to have found an underdetermina-
tion rival does not speak against the fact that p(FU |AU ,X ) = 1 – which is a necessary
truth since it is impossible to find something of a kind that does not exist – it does
highlight the fact that it is assumed in the debate as a whole that it is possible to re-
liably estimate whether a given theory that has already been discovered is indeed an
underdetermination rival to another theory. Indeed, this assumption is essential to the
New Induction’s argumentative strategy since if we could not reliably locate historical
cases of underdetermination rivals then proponents of the New Induction could not ar-
gue that they are sufficiently common in the history of science to inductively warrant
the conclusion that most current successful theories are underdetermined as well.
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sensitivity: p(FU |AU ,X ); the frequency of theories for which an un-
derdetermination rival has been discovered among theories in X for
which such rivals exist.12
Put in terms of probabilities, we can say that the probability that a given
theory in X has underdetermination rivals depends on (i) the probability
that there are such rivals to theories in X regardless of whether they have
been found (plausibility), and (ii) the probability that we would have
found such rivals to theories in X if they existed (sensitivity). Thus let us
examine each of the two factors in turn to see what it reveals about how to
construct a set X for which theories are least likely to be underdetermined.
plausibility is a measure of how frequently a theory in X as a whole
has no underdetermination rivals. Now, note that to the extent that a given
theory is well supported by the available evidence – i.e. empirically suc-
cessful – it is also unlikely that a rival theory is better supported than it is.
Thus, all other things being equal, the empirical success enjoyed by a given
theory increases the plausibility that no other theory is an underdeter-
mination rival to it. For this reason, realists may insist that the very fact
that empirically successful theories are successful makes them unlikely to
have underdetermination rivals. This might be taken to support the realist
thesis that empirically successful theories are unlikely to be underdeter-
mined. In particular, then, since currently accepted theories are arguably
much more successful than their now-discarded counterparts, realists may
argue that current theories are much less likely to be underdetermined.13
Realists may be right about this point, but it will hardly convince those
who are sympathetic with anti-realism to begin with. After all, the claim
12I have deliberately chosen terms for these two factors that are not widely used in the
literature on scientific theory testing in order to prevent them from being confused with
a number of factors discussed in that literature. For example, although sensitivity is
superficially similar to “statistical power”, i.e. the probability that a false null hypothesis
will be rejected in an empirical test, it would be misleading to refer to p(FU |AU ,X ) as
a given theory’s “statistical power” since that falsely suggests that the theory has this
kind of statistical power with regard to a set of results from an empirical test. After
all, note that sensitivity is concerned with the probability that a group of scientists
discover underdetermination rivals to theories in a given set, which is a feature that does
not depend directly on the features of any empirical test.
13This argument is implicit in many realist responses to the New Induction, but Devitt
(2011) arguably provides the clearest and most careful objection of this sort.
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that empirically successful theories are unlikely to be underdetermined is
precisely the point that anti-realists have been in the business of denying
ever since Laudan’s (1981) historical challenge to realism. Anti-realists of
this stripe will argue that empirical success is a poor guide to plausibility
by appealing to the many cases from the history of science of very successful
theories that later turned out to have underdetermination rivals. Indeed,
this is exactly what Stanford (2006) aims to do with his New Induction.
We will examine this argument in more detail below, but my point for now
is that to assume that more empirically successful theories have a higher
degree of plausibility is at best to beg the question against the anti-
realist. The response outlined in this paper, by contrast, has the advantage
of not assuming that plausibility is higher for more successful theories
than for their less successful counterparts. Thus the response will provide
a non-question-begging way of avoiding the New Induction.
To see how this response works, note that our analysis of when “absence
of evidence” is “evidence of absence” shows that a theory may be unlikely
to be underdetermined even if plausibility is very low – provided that
sensitivity is high enough to compensate. For example, suppose for ex-
ample that p(AU |X ) = 0.2 and p(FU |AU ,X ) = 0.9. Now, by plugging
these numbers into equation (3) we get p(AU |FU ,X ) ≈ 0.714. This illus-
trates that the fact that a given set has a low plausibility does not by
itself show that the theories in the set are likely to be underdetermined,
since the set’s sensitivity may compensate for this. So we have in sen-
sitivity a principled rationale for distinguishing between sets of theories
that are more and less likely to be underdetermined that does not beg the
question against the epistemic anti-realist.
Now, recall that sensitivity is here the frequency among underdeter-
mined theories in X of theories for which an underdetermination rival has
been discovered. Put in terms of probabilities, sensitivity is the prob-
ability of that we would have found underdetermination rivals to a given
theory in X given that such a rival exists. But what kind of factors indi-
cate whether that is the case for a given set of theories X ? Clearly, the
kinds of factors that are relevant will depend to a large extent on those
who are looking for the theories – i.e. on the scientists themselves and the
communities they form. For that reason, we shouldn’t expect to find any
kind of algorithm determining sensitivity. At best, we can try to iden-
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tify some such factors given assumptions about the nature and structure
of scientific communities – assumptions that may very well be called into
question. That said, it seems to me that it ought to be uncontroversial
that the following four factors will, ceteris paribus, indicate that a set of
theories has a higher or lower degree of sensitivity:
(i) Domain: First of all, the nature of the theoretic domain itself will
be relevant to how difficult it is to discover underdetermination rivals
if there are any. As emphasized by both (Roush, 2005, 211-12) and
(Stanford, 2009), some areas are such that, due to various psycholog-
ical barriers, it is more difficult to construct theories in those areas.
For example, if a domain of inquiry calls for very complicated theories,
then it may be harder to conceptualize what alternatives to theories
in that domain would look like. Additionally, some domain may call
for theories that are simply quite alien to our everyday ways of con-
ceptualizing the world, in which case it may be harder to conceive of
what plausible theories in that domain would be like. If it is true, for
example, that our way of conceptualizing the world is basically New-
tonian, then domains that call for radically non-Newtonian thinking
(e.g. cosmology and subatomic particle physics) may be such that
underdetermination rivals are more likely to remain undiscovered.14
(ii) Anti-dogmatism. Second, the extent to which scientists are willing
to consider alternative theoretical approaches in their fields will of
course be a factor in determining the probability of finding an under-
determination rival to a given theory, if there is one. Now, followers
of Kuhn (1996, 1977), will no doubt urge that in so far as theories
that are widely accepted and fundamental to a scientific discipline,
scientists will have to rely heavily on them in their daily investiga-
tions, and so have less of an incentive to discover rivals to them. If so,
then there would be little incentives to discover rivals to fundamental
and widely accepted theories, leading to a kind of dogmatism with
14Thus, assuming that unobservables are, all other things being equal, harder to
conceptualize, there is some truth to the anti-realist claim that theories that concern
unobservables are, all other things being equal, more likely to be underdetermined.
However, as I’ll emphasize below, other things are not always, or even usually, equal,
and so theories about unobservables can very well be less likely to be underdetermined
than theories about observables.
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regard to accepted theories.15 However, it has also be argued that
alternative theories often play an indispensable role in both develop-
ing and testing the theories that we already consider most promising
(Feyerabend, 1963), and that the imperative to consider new theo-
retical approaches is an essential part of the scientific ethos (Merton,
1973).16 While my sympathies lie squarely with the second viewpoint,
I shall not argue for it here or assume it in what follows. Instead,
I shall grant for the sake of the argument that individual scientists
may exhibit considerable dogmatism with regard to alternative theo-
retical approaches, and argue that Stanford’s New Induction can still
be undermined.
(iii) Community. Third, the nature and size of the scientific community
working with a theory will clearly be relevant for how likely it is
that there are no underdetermination rivals to a theory if it hasn’t
yet been found. Most obviously, the more scientists there are in a
given field the more likely it is that one of them has found, or per-
haps stumbled upon, an underdetermination rival to a given theory
if it existed. Relatedly, some communities of scientists will be more
skilled at theorizing than others, e.g. because they possess greater
background evidence that influences their conception of possible the-
oretical frameworks. Scientific theorizing (like philosophical theo-
rizing) is a skill that can be gained by training and selected for in
various social selection processes (e.g. in applications for graduate
school, professorships, and research funding).
(iv) Time. A fourth factor is simply the period of time a theory has
been accepted or contemplated. A theory that has been considered
for a long time, especially if widely accepted during that time, can
be expected to have a richer history of searches for rivals and use in
various scientific and ordinary contexts. Thus, the longer a theory has
been accepted or considered by a scientific community, the likelier it
is that the fact that we haven’t found any underdetermination rivals
15See Magnus (2010) for an argument along these lines.
16Indeed, anti-dogmatism is really just compliance with the norm of “organized skep-
ticism”, which the eminent sociologist of science Robert Merton argued was one of the
four norms comprising the scientific ethos.
16
to it is due to the fact that there are none to be found.
We have identified four factors which plausibly indicate sensitivity, and
thus the probability that a given empirically successful theory for which
no underdetermination rivals have been found will not have any such ri-
vals: (i) domain, (ii) anti-dogmatism, (iii) community, and (iv) time. I call
these “identifiable indicators” of sensitivity in order to emphasize that,
in contrast to sensitivity itself, they are factors which can be fairly eas-
ily identified in historical case-studies. As such, they may provide a rough
guide to sensitivity in historical cases where we obviously do not have di-
rect access to the probability that an underdetermination rival would have
been discovered if it existed.
Of course, this ease of identification comes at a price, in that these fac-
tors are less precise and more intricate than the more precisely defined and
rigorously motivated sensitivity. However, it seems undeniable that each
of these factors provides at least some indication, ceteris paribus, of a given
theory’s sensitivity. For example, it would be more than a little implau-
sible to insist that a larger and more competent community of scientists is
not, ceteris paribus, more likely to have discovered an underdetermination
rival to a given theory if such a rival existed. Thus, while we may disagree
on how strong an indication of sensitivity each of these factors provide,
it can hardly be contended that these factors are irrelevant to sensitiv-
ity. Note also that the four factors will often be synergetic, combining
to produce an effect on sensitivity that may be greater (or lesser) than
the sum of their parts. As indicated above, I will not attempt to provide
any algorithm for agglomerating these factors into an overall estimation of
sensitivity. This is not only because I do not believe any such agglom-
eration procedure could reasonably be provided, but also because (as we
shall see below) no such agglomeration is needed for the argument below
to go through.
At any rate, it’s important to note that, as with sensitivity itself, all
of the identifiable indicators come in degrees. As a consequence, the risk of
underdetermination for a given theory will also be a matter of degree. Only
in very exceptional cases can we be absolutely sure either that our theory is
underdetermined, or that it’s not. So the point of the identifiable indicators
is not to find a way to guarantee that one’s theories are not underdeter-
mined, but to distinguish between theories that are more and less likely to
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be underdetermined. Indeed, in what follows I will not be assuming that
identifiable indicators can tell us the particular degree of sensitivity had
by a given theory. Rather, I shall assume only that we can use the identifi-
able indicators as our guide in identifying some theories as having a higher
degree of sensitivity than other theories. In other words, I’ll use the
identifiable indicators only as guides to comparative rather than absolute
degrees of sensitivity. As it turns out, these comparative evaluations of
sensitivity will suffice in undermining Stanford’s New Induction.
4 The New Induction
The New Induction begins with the undeniable historical observation that
for a great many theories that were accepted in the past, often because they
were very successful, later investigation would reveal alternative theories
that were equally well supported given the available evidence. In short,
these theories turned out to have underdetermination rivals (in the sense
spelled out in section 1). From this it is inferred by a simple enumera-
tive induction that the typical situation in science is that even empirically
successful theories – including those that are currently accepted – have “un-
conceived” (i.e. undiscovered) underdetermination rivals. In other words,
the argument concludes that empirically successful theories are typically
underdetermined, which of course is what the relevant underdetermination
thesis, RTU, claims. (Although versions of this argument have been ad-
vanced by Hesse (1976), Sklar (1981), Laudan (1981), and Roush (2005),
I shall focus on the version given by Stanford (2006), since his is arguably
the most developed, sophisticated and widely-discussed version.)
What makes the New Induction so challenging for realists is that it
promises to undermine the notion that we are justified in believing even
those theories that are truly empirically successful, on any plausible defi-
nition of “empirical success”. The reason for this is that the inductive base
of the New Induction consists of theories that, undeniably, enjoyed great
empirical successes. For example, Fresnel’s ether theory of light was hugely
successful, even by realists’ lights, and yet it was superseded by what is ar-
guably a better supported theory a few decades later. (I will return to this
example shortly.) The New Induction concludes that empirical success is
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a poor indicator of whether a theory is underdetermined, and thus that we
are not justified in believing even very successful scientific theories to be
true, at least not “in those parts of the sciences that seek to theorize about
the fundamental constitutions of the various domains of the natural world
and the dynamical principles at work in those domains”. (Stanford, 2006,
32)
As I indicated towards the end of section 1, my strategy for responding
to this argument will be to identify a proper subset of empirically successful
theories for which the induction is weakest. It should be clear by now what
that proper subset is: It is the set of successful theories for which sensitiv-
ity is higher than the now discarded (but at the time successful) theories
which turned out to have unconceived underdetermination rivals. Since a
successful theory with higher sensitivity is, as we have seen, less likely to
be underdetermined than an otherwise similar theory with lower sensitiv-
ity, an inductive argument from a set of theories with lower sensitivity
to those with higher sensitivity will clearly be a weak argument. (Com-
pare: Since I know that it is less likely to rain when the air pressure is
higher, an argument from the fact that it rained the past three days to the
conclusion that it will rain today is weak if my barometer tells me that the
air pressure rose this morning.)
Of course, this point will only be interesting if there are at least some
currently accepted theories for which sensitivity is indeed higher than for
the theories that form the inductive base of Stanford’s New Induction. To
see why there are such theories, it will be useful to consider the “identifiable
indicators” of sensitivity for underdetermination rivals that I proposed
in the previous section. In order for Stanford’s argument to support the
claim that a given presently accepted successful theory T is likely to be
underdetermined, one would need to specify an inductive base containing
theories for which domain, anti-dogmatism, community, and time indicate
a greater or similar level of sensitivity. I submit that we can be rather
optimistic that for many of our currently accepted theories there will simply
not be enough now-discarded theories to figure in the skeptic’s inductive
base. To illustrate the point, I will briefly consider two cases from the
history of science that have been taken to be especially problematic for
scientific realism.
Consider first Augustin-Jean Fresnel’s ether theory of light, which was
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later replaced by James Clerk Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory.17 The
relevant question is: How reasonable was it to believe that we would have
found underdetermination rivals to Fresnel’s theory if they existed (as we
now know that they did)?18 To focus the discussion, let us consider Fres-
nel’s claim that light travels as a wave in a material medium. As is well
documented, Francois Arago showed in 1818 (to Simeon Poisson’s great
surprise) that Fresnel’s theory’s prediction that a bright spot would appear
at the center of the shadow of an opaque disc was indeed correct. In 1855,
however, Maxwell presented a rival theory to that of Fresnel, in which it
was posited that the material in which light waves travel was a complicated
system of molecular vortices (later to be replaced by the electromagnetic
field, yielding Maxwell’s famous electromagnetic theory of light).
Now, consider Fresnel’s claim just before Maxwell’s presentation of a
rival theory of the medium of light waves in 1855. My claim is that Fresnel’s
situation was dissimilar to the situation we are in today with regard to many
currently accepted theories. Consider, for example, the currently accepted
theory of light – the photon theory (as I will call it) – on which light consists
of collections of photons with a “dual nature” of both electromagnetic waves
and discrete particles. How does the photon theory compare with Fresnel’s
with regard to each of the identifiable indicators of sensitivity?
Let’s consider the four factors in turn: (i) First, the domain of inquiry
of each theory is the same, of course, since they are theories about the
very same things. (ii) Second, although it is hard to evaluate the anti-
dogmatism exhibited by scientists in different time periods, there is no
reason to think Fresnel’s contemporaries were less prone to being dogmatic
about their theories than the optical physicist of the 20th and 21st century.
Indeed, a study conducted in 2002 suggests that around 90% of scientists
believe that the scientists should “consider all new evidence, hypotheses,
theories, and innovations, even those that challenge or contradict their
own work.” (Anderson et al., 2010, 7) For obvious reasons, there are no
17This is one of the most widely discussed cases of empirically successful theories for
which it turned out that underdetermination rivals existed. See, for example, (Worrall,
1989, 1994), (Psillos, 1999), and (Chakravartty, 2007).
18Note that the question is not whether it’s reasonable to believe now that Fresnel’s
theory had such rivals. The question is whether it was reasonable at the time.
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comparable studies from Fresnel’s time, but this study suggest that current
scientists are unlikely to bemore dogmatic than Fresnel’s contemporaries.19
(iii) Third, the community of theoretical physicists has grown and matured
significantly since 1855. Indeed, based on the exponential growth of journal
articles in physics (with a doubling time of around 10-15 years) and similar
trends in the number of working scientists cited in biographical records
of scientists, we have good reason to believe that the number of working
physicists has increased exponentially as well. (Price, 1961, 1963; Larsen
and von Ins, 2010) Moreover, given the increasing professionalization of
physical science since the late 19th century (see, e.g., Bockstaele, 2004),
contemporary physicists will certainly have a greater stock of background
knowledge, better access to relevant research, and a more rigorous formal
education than the scientists of the early 19th century. As a case in point,
we may note that Fresnel himself was not trained specifically as an optical
physicist, and started his career as a chemist before switching to optical
physics a few years before presenting his ether theory. (Buchwald, 1989,
113-114) (iv) Fourth, the photon theory has undeniably been considered for
a much longer time than Fresnel’s theory had in 1855: The photon theory
was first formulated by Einstein in 1905, and so has been considered for well
over a century, whereas Fresnel’s theory was first formulated in 1818 and
so had only been considered for less than four decades in 1855. (Buchwald,
1989) So, in sum, domain and anti-dogmatism favors neither the photon
theory nor the ether theory, while community and time both strongly favor
the photon theory.
This is not an isolated case of a currently accepted theory being dissimi-
lar with respect to sensitivity to the theories that form the inductive base
of the New Induction. In fact, the same point can be made about Stanford’s
central case study, viz. theories of biological heredity in the 19th century.
(Stanford, 2006, chapters 3-5) At least three serious theories were proposed,
each one with at least some degree of empirical success: Charles Darwin’s
“pangenesis” theory, which was replaced by Francis Galton’s “stirp” theory,
19Of course, current scientists may be more confident in the photon theory than
Fresnel’s contemporaries were in his ether theory, but we shouldn’t confuse confidence in
theories with a dogmatic attitude towards alternative approaches. Besides, the photon
theory itself underwent a significant period in the early 20th century where there was
widespread doubt about the truth of the theory.
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which in turn was replaced by August Weismann’s “germ-plasm” theory.
Now, Stanford points out that Darwin, Galton and Weismann were all ap-
parently unable to conceive of the theory that would later replace their
own. But does this support the conclusion that our currently accepted
theory of heredity – roughly, a version of Mendelian genetics – will also one
day be replaced by a rival that is at least as well supported by the available
evidence? Only if Darwin’s, Galton’s and Weismann’s theories had, at the
time of their acceptance, a degree of sensitivity that is comparable to
that which Mendelian genetics has today.20
So let’s consider briefly how the theories compare with regard to the four
identifiable indicators of sensitivity: (i) First, all of these theories are in
the same domain, so there is no difference in that regard between Mendelian
genetics and the three alternative theories of heredity. (ii) Second, there
is again no reason to think that scientists who accept Mendelian genetics
are, as a rule, more dogmatic than those following Darwin, Galton and
Weismann in the 19th century, so there is no plausible difference with
regard to anti-dogmatism. (iii) Third, the scientific community of biologists
working on heredity was of course significantly smaller than it is now, which
is again evidenced by an exponential growth in published journal articles
in biology and similar trends in the number of working scientists cited
in biographical records. (Price, 1961, 1963; Larsen and von Ins, 2010)
Furthermore, the study of genetics and heredity in particular was in its
infancy as a profession when Darwin, Galton and Weismann were proposing
their theories in the late 19th century.21 This fact is noted by Ernst Mayr in
his discussion of the progression of biology from the 19th century onwards
in The Growth of Biological Thought :
In many disciplines and subdisciplines, there was only a single
specialist at any one time. So few people were working in the
different branches of biology that Darwin thought he could af-
ford to wait twenty years before publishing his theory of natural
20I am assuming here that Mendelian genetics is at least as successful empirically as
each of the other theories, and thus that it can be assumed to have at least as high
plausibility.
21As a case in point, the genetics societies of Britain and the United States were not
founded until 1919 and 1931 respectively. The official journals of each society, Heredity
and Genetics, were established in 1947 and 1916 respectively.
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selection. He was quite thunderstruck when somebody else (A.
R. Wallace) had the same idea. When the professionalization
of biology began with the establishment of chairs for diverse
branches of biology at many universities and when each profes-
sor began educating numerous young specialists, an exponential
acceleration in the rate of scientific production occurred. (Mayr,
1982, 111)
(iii) Fourth, there is a significant difference with regard to time: Mendelian
genetics has been accepted, in one form or another, for at least a century,
whereas all of the theories Stanford discusses – Darwin’s, Galton’s and
Weismann’s – were presented to, and rejected by, the scientific community
within the space of around three decades (roughly from 1868, when Darwin
first presented his pangenesis theory, to the turn of the century, when
Mendelian genetics first became widely known). (Bowler, 1989) So, in sum,
we again have that domain and anti-dogmatism favors neither Mendelian
genetics nor any of the other three theories, while community and time
both strongly favor Mendelian genetics.
Of course, much more could be said about these cases to illustrate more
fully how the four identifiable indicators are realized in concrete terms.
My point, however, is a general one – illustrated but not constituted by
these two cases – viz., that since sensitivity is indicated by historical and
sociological factors such as the amount of time a theory has been accepted
and the size and structure of the community that accepts it, many of the
theories that we accept today quite clearly have a higher sensitivity than
those theories that are used by Stanford and other anti-realists to infer
that scientific theories are typically underdetermined. This is a distinction
that really makes a difference, since theories with higher sensitivity are
less likely to be underdetermined, all else being equal. Note that this
is not to deny that one can find some empirically successful and widely
accepted theories about which the historical record suggests that we should
be skeptical, e.g. theories that have recently been proposed, form part of
some “fringe-science”, or that concern some aspects of reality that we have
reason to believe is exceptionally hard to conceptualize. Rather, the point
is that there will be a suitably restricted subset of empirically successful and
currently accepted theories for which the New Induction loses its original
force.
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I’ll now make a few clarificatory remarks in order to circumvent some ob-
jections. First, it must of course be conceded that there are historical cases
in which an empirically successful theory with an apparently high degree of
sensitivity (as measured by the identifiable indicators) did turn out to
have an underdetermination rival. The obvious example here is Newtonian
mechanics, which was replaced by Einstein’s theories of special and general
relativity after being accepted for a long time by a fairly large scientific
community. One might take such cases to illustrate that sensitivity may
be low even when the identifiable indicators are present to a high degree.
But of course, we should expect some theories with high sensitivity to
be underdetermined, since a high degree of sensitivity is not meant to
guarantee that a theory is not underdetermined. So as long as cases like
Newtonian Mechanics are rare among those that satisfy the four indicators
of sensitivity, as they do indeed seem to be, the mere existence of some
such cases poses no threat to the claim that the four identifiable indica-
tors provide a reliable guide to theories with high sensitivity. Indeed,
the very fact that such cases are rare in the history of science might be
taken to support the conclusion that these indicators jointly capture the
most important respects in which sensitivity presents itself for scientific
theories.22
Second, note that the strength of this response to Stanford’s New Induc-
tion, like Stanford’s induction itself, will be a matter of degree. My strategy
in this paper has been to undermine Stanford’s induction by showing that
the inductive base – consisting of various empirically successful theories
accepted in the past – is dissimilar from the inductive target – consisting
of various empirically successful and currently accepted theories – in a re-
spect that bears crucially on the probability that the inductive target will
have the relevant property if the inductive base does – where the relevant
property is that of being probably underdetermined. Now, how much does
this undermine the New Induction? Well, that clearly depends on how dis-
similar the inductive target is to the inductive base in the relevant respect,
22Compare: Suppose I claim that most Swedish residents are protestants. It is no
good objection to my claim to point out that Petersen, a Swedish resident, is catholic
– especially not if the overwhelming majority of other Swedes that we have met have
been protestants. That some of the Swedes we run into are non-protestants is exactly
what we should expect if I were right that most (but not all) of them are protestants.
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i.e. on how much more sensitivity can be claimed for present theories as
compared with their past counterparts.
Assuming that we agree on the historical facts, this issue will turn on
how well the identifiable indicators listed in the previous section track sen-
sitivity. Opinions will no doubt be divided on this issue. Some will agree
with the present author that the greater time and larger, more qualified
community of the photon theory as compared with the ether theory of
light, for example, indicates a significant difference in sensitivity and
thus that an inductive argument from one to the other is very weak indeed.
But even those who disagree about this point must surely acknowledge that
many currently accepted theories have, in light of factors such as greater
time and larger community, at least somewhat higher sensitivity than
their past counterparts. Now, while a greater difference in sensitivity
undermines the New Induction to a greater extent, any difference in sen-
sitivity undermines it to some extent, so even the most skeptical reader
must acknowledge that the New Induction has been undermined (albeit
perhaps only moderately) for those current theories.
5 Conclusion
As I have emphasized throughout, the key notion in this paper is sen-
sitivity – the extent to which it’s plausible that one would have found
things of a certain kind given that there are such things. When applied to
what I called “underdetermination rivals”, i.e. theories that are equally well
supported by one’s current evidence than accepted theories, I argued that
sensitivity varies with four “identifiable indicators”, viz. the psychologi-
cal accessibility of the domain of the theory in question, the anti-dogmatism
with regard to alternative theoretical approaches, the nature of the com-
munity that potentially discovers such theories, and finally the time that
a theory has been accepted or considered. My response to the New In-
duction, in brief, was that even if it is assumed (with the anti-realist) that
the high level of empirical success of our current theories is an unreliable
indicator of the existence of undiscovered underdetermination rivals, the in-
ductive inference is weak for a suitably restricted set of currently accepted
theories because we have good reasons to think that that sensitivity is
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(considerably) higher for those theories than for their counterparts in the
New Induction’s inductive base.
Note that to a large extent the “identifiable indicators” I discussed con-
cern the history and sociological structure of scientific communities. Such
factors have tended to downplayed by scientific realists, and emphasized by
what may be described as their polar opposites – so-called “social construc-
tivists” about science. One of the upshots of this paper is that realists may
well have done themselves a disservice in this respect. Instead of avoiding
the history and sociology of scientific communities, realists should see in-
vestigations in these fields as potential sources of considerations in defense
of scientific realism. In this paper, I have identified the kind of factors
that will be relevant in this regard, and shown how at least two currently
accepted scientific theories (the photon theory of light and Mendelian ge-
netics) compare (very) favorably in this regard to the past theories that
the New Induction takes as its inductive base.
Relatedly, I have suggested that a plausible version of epistemic scientific
realism – one that avoids Stanford’s New Induction – is a “selective” realism
that selects as justified those claims made by successful scientific theories
that enjoy a certain kind of privileged status within scientific communities.
Given the importance of the nature of scientific communities in this regard,
this paper can be seen as taking the first steps towards a distinctively
social scientific realism. That said, readers will note that I have not here
given a positive argument for this realist position of the kind that many
epistemic realists take themselves to possess in the form of the well-known
No-Miracles Argument. Although a detailed discussion of whether such
an argument can be given lies outside the scope of this paper, I will note
that I am myself skeptical of “wholesale” arguments for realism of this sort,
and instead favor “piecemeal” arguments for specific theories being justified
based on the evidence that scientists themselves appeal to in a given case.23
Thus, in my view, the most important philosophical work for any epistemic
realist consists in responding to the anti-realist arguments that are meant
to undermine the support for scientific theories provided by the scientific
evidence itself. It is this sort of work that I have undertaken here.
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